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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






TABU N. MCCLURE, a/k/a Tabu Phillips, 




COMMISSIONER JEFFREY T. HASTE; BOARD OF DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON; 
 DEPUTY WARDEN D. W. CARROLL; LT. HOSTETTER; SGT. R. ADAMS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-02249) 
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 1, 2020 
 
Before:  KRAUSE, MATEY, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





Tabu McClure, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of two of the Defendants.1  For the reasons detailed below, 
we will vacate and remand. 
I. 
McClure brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting, as relevant, a 
Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim against Lt. Hostetter and Deputy Warden 
Carroll.2  The District Court construed the claim as an Eighth Amendment claim after 
concluding that McClure, as a parole violator, was the equivalent of “a convicted person 
punished by incarceration,” rather than a pretrial detainee.3  McClure was confined in 
Dauphin County Prison during the relevant events, but is now confined elsewhere. 
McClure alleged the following set of facts.4  On February 8, 2013, around 11:00 
p.m., two guards told McClure to turn the light on in his cell.  When he did not do so (he 
 
1 We note that the Defendants also argued below that McClure had failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies.  The District Court disagreed, concluding that he had properly 
exhausted.  The Defendants have not challenged that holding on appeal. 
 
2 McClure’s initial complaint named nine Defendants.  (Dkt. No. 1).  After the District 
Court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Dkt. Nos. 27, 28), McClure filed an 
amended complaint, naming five Defendants, (Dkt. No. 29).  The District Court, sua 
sponte, dismissed the claims against three of the Defendants.  (Dkt. No. 30).  Later, the 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Lt. Hostetter and Deputy Warden 
Carroll.  (Dkt. Nos. 99-101).  On appeal, McClure challenges only the summary 
judgment decision.  (See Appellant’s Br.). 
 
3 McClure has not challenged this determination on appeal.  
 




claims the light was broke), he was written up and placed in administrative segregation.  
The segregation cell was very cold and he had only a t-shirt, jumpsuit bottom, and 
slippers.  His requests for sheets, blankets, and a pillow went unanswered.  After a couple 
of hours, he ripped the stuffing out of his mattress and crawled inside the mattress to stay 
warm.  Around 2:00 a.m., a guard wrote him up for destroying the mattress.  The write-
up claimed that McClure used the stuffing from the mattress to cover up his window, 
which is prohibited.  McClure denied doing so.  McClure was then taken to a “strip cell” 
and put in a restraint chair until morning.   
Beginning the morning of February 9, 2013, and lasting through September 3, 
2013, McClure was subjected to a mattress restriction, pursuant to which his mattress was 
taken away during the daytime, and then returned each night.  The mattress he was given 
each night was the one from which he had ripped the stuffing.  His cell contained a 
concrete slab upon which he could lay the mattress at night.  McClure described the 
mattress in his deposition: 
It was basically a shell.  It wasn’t really a mattress at that point.  I would 
just call it like a shell of a mattress, that is how I described it, because the 
insulation inside of it didn’t exist anymore. . . .  
 
 
of perjury, and from McClure’s deposition.  (Dkt. Nos. 29, 89-2).  The District Court 
stated that McClure did not follow local rules regarding the filing of a statement of 
material facts, but instead “filed his own statement of material facts without regard to that 
of Defendants.”  (Dkt. No. 99 at 8 n.3).  However, based on our review, McClure’s 
“Statement of Disputed Factual Issues,” contained numbered paragraphs which directly 
corresponded to the numbered paragraph in the Defendants’ “Statement of Material 




I would use my paperwork and stuff to create like a layer, keep it off the 
concrete, so it wouldn’t be cold, so it wouldn’t seep through the concrete.  
So I would use paper underneath or folders or books or whatever I had.  I 
had a blanket also and I was given a full jumpsuit, so I would use some of 
those things. 
 
(Dkt. No. 89-2 at 29:22-30:1; 30:15-21).   
McClure had a preexisting back problem, which was exacerbated by the mattress 
restriction—both the nighttime issues with the defective mattress, and also not having a 
mattress to sit or lie on during the day.  After a couple of weeks, he began to experience a 
substantial amount of pain in his lower back, along with sciatica and tingling and 
numbness in his legs.  He signed up for medical treatment on several occasions, 
beginning around March 20, 2013, but was only given Motrin for 5-7 days each time.5  
The mattress restriction lasted over 200 days.  Defendants asserted that the restriction was 
extended repeatedly because of McClure’s behavior—such as trying to hold onto the 
mattress in the morning and being verbally abusive when it was taken away from him. 
The mattress restriction was put in place by an order issued by Lt. Hostetter on 
behalf of Deputy Warden Carroll.  McClure alleged that:  “On numerous occasions I 
spoke to Lt. Hostetter about the prolonged mattress deprivation and the harm it was 
causing me.”  (Dkt. No. 29 at 60).  He also alleged that he spoke to Carroll about the 
“mattress situation,” but that Carroll said he did not have time to deal with it.  (Id.).  
McClure also testified in his deposition as to these interactions with Lt. Hostetter and 
 
5 At one point, McClure was cut off from receiving Motrin because he was allegedly 




Deputy Warden Carroll.  (Dkt. No. 89-2 at 27-28).  The mattress restriction finally ended 
when McClure left Dauphin County Prison. 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Lt. Hostetter and 
Deputy Warden Carroll.  McClure timely appealed.   
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the Defendants.   See Blunt v. 
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).   
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the 
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions” of the record 
which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.  Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving 
party then must present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial.  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c)(1), (e)(2); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).   
III. 
 Summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of Lt. Hostetter and 
Deputy Warden Carroll.  For the reasons explained below, we will vacate the grant of 




The Eighth Amendment prohibits deprivations suffered during incarceration “that 
constitute an ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ including ‘those that are totally 
without penological justification.’”  Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 
372 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 308 (1991)).  A 
successful Eight Amendment claim based on a prisoner’s conditions of confinement has 
two components.  “First, ‘the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently 
serious,’ resulting in ‘the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’”  
Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).  This is a totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis.  “Conditions . . . alone or in combination[] may deprive inmates 
of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and “[s]ome conditions of 
confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each 
would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces 
the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.”  
Id. at 373-74 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304, and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 
347 (1981)).  This Court has noted that “[s]leep is critical to human existence, and 
conditions that prevent sleep have been held to violate the Eighth Amendment.’”  Id. 
(quoting Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2013) (alteration in original)); see 
also Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[S]leep undoubtedly counts 




Second, a successful conditions-of-confinement claim requires a showing that a 
prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., deliberate indifference to 
the inmate’s health or safety.  Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, and Wilson, 501 U.S. at 
302-03).  “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be 
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
We will address the deliberate-indifference requirement first.  The District Court 
concluded that “McClure has not demonstrated that Defendants knew or were aware of a 
risk to his health or safety by imposing the daytime mattress restriction.”  (Dkt. No. 99 at 
29).  To the contrary, we conclude that McClure created a genuine issue of fact in this 
regard, given his sworn allegations in his amended complaint, and his deposition 
testimony, that he spoke to Lt. Hostetter on numerous occasions about the harm the 
mattress restriction was causing him and also tried to talk to Deputy Warden Carroll, who 
blew him off.6  Accordingly, we conclude that McClure created a triable issue as to the 
Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the harm he suffered as a result of the mattress 
restriction. 
With regard to the mattress restriction, although the District Court correctly noted 
that “[t]he length of the inmate’s exposure to the alleged unconstitutional conditions and 
 
6 Although the Defendants assert that McClure did not in any meaningful way cite to the 
evidentiary record in his “Statement of Disputed Factual Issues,” McClure did in fact 
specifically cite the relevant page of his deposition.  (Dkt. No. 95 at ¶ 30) (citing Dkt. No. 




the totality of the circumstances must be considered when making a determination as to 
whether a condition amounts to cruel and unusual punishment,” (Dkt. No. 99 at 27), the 
District Court went on to state that “[t]he Third Circuit has concluded that an inmate is 
not subject to cruel and unusual punishment when he is deprived of a mattress during the 
day and has the mattress returned to him at night,” (id. at 28).  The District Court stated 
this latter proposition as a matter of law, suggesting it applied regardless of important 
factors, such as the length of the deprivation and the totality of the circumstances.   
Indeed, the District Court relied exclusively on cases in which inmates were 
subjected to daytime mattress restrictions for significantly shorter periods of time than the 
200-plus days at issue here.7  In their appellate brief, the Defendants rely on the same 
cases and add one more, where the restriction lasted a week.  See Jackson v. Lencovich, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47182 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 2005).  There was no indication in any 
of these cases that the inmates were given a defective mattress in the evenings, or that 
they had pre-existing back problems that were exacerbated by the mattress restriction.   
Defendants also cited several cases in their appellate brief in which courts held 
that complete deprivations of mattresses for short periods of time did not violate the 
 
7 See Anderson v. Warden of Berks Cty. Prison, 602 F. App’x 892 (3d Cir. 2015) (per 
curiam) (restriction lasted less than a month); Alex v. Stalder, 225 F. App’x 313 (5th Cir. 
2007) (51 days); Mestre v. Wagner, 2012 WL 300724  (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2012) (13 days); 
Gannaway v. Berks Cty. Prison, 2011 WL 1196905 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2011) (one stretch 
of 15 days, one stretch of 22 days); Andrews v. Vance, 2005 WL 3307334 (M.D. Pa. 




Eighth Amendment.8   To a degree, these cases are more on point, given that McClure 
alleged the mattress he received each night “wasn’t really a mattress at that point,” but, 
rather, was a “like shell of a mattress.”  However, these cases do not help the Defendants 
as McClure’s deprivation of a functional mattress did not last a few days; it lasted over 
200 days.  We conclude that McClure adequately presented a claim that the mattress 
restriction was “objectively, sufficiently serious, resulting in the denial of the minimal 
civilized measure of life’s necessities,” based on the totality of the circumstances here—a 
prisoner with pre-existing back problems being subjected, for a period in excess of 200 
days, to the effective deprivation of a mattress at night, and the complete deprivation of a 
mattress during the day, resulting in substantial pain in his lower back, sciatica, and 
tingling and numbness in his legs. 
However, the Defendants resurrect another argument on appeal—one the District 
Court did not reach—which we must address.  The Defendants argue that “whatever 
adversity was occasioned by the [mattress] restriction, [Defendants] cannot be held liable 
for it, as [McClure] clearly brought it upon himself.”  Essentially, the Defendants’ 
argument is that McClure initially found himself with a defective mattress through his 
 
8 See Stephens v. Cottey, 145 F. App’x 179 (7th Cir. 2005) (deprivation of mattress for 
three days where inmate slept on steel bed frame did not violate Eighth Amendment); 
Milhouse v. Gee, 2011 WL 3627414 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2011) (“short period” of days); 
Castro v. Chesney, 1998 WL 767467 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1998) (two days); Collins v. 
Klotz, 1994 WL 371479 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 1994) (holding that short delays in replacing 
beds and mattresses destroyed by an inmate did not constitute Eighth Amendment 
violations because prison officials could not be expected to “instantaneously” replace 




own doing, i.e., ripping the stuffing out of his mattress, and that he prolonged his time 
with the defective mattress by committing infractions, such as often refusing to relinquish 
the mattress in the morning when officers tried to take it away from him and being 
verbally abusive to them as they took it.  The Defendants also point to a litany of 
McClure’s unrelated misconduct: flooding his cell once by flushing his toilet repeatedly, 
blocking his cell window once with a towel, impermissibly shaving his head twice, 
making a “throat-cutting” gesture to an officer, and attempting to strike an officer and 
throwing a newspaper at the officer.  McClure was told by staff members that if he 
behaved himself, the mattress restriction would be lifted.   
Thus, the Defendants’ position, very literally, is that McClure made his own bed 
and then had to lie in it.  More precisely put, the Defendants contend that, even assuming 
the mattress restriction otherwise would have constituted an Eighth Amendment 
violation, it did not here because McClure himself destroyed the mattress and engaged in 
related misconduct (refusing to relinquish the mattress come morning and verbally 
abusing officers for taking it), and unrelated misconduct of the various kinds described 
above.  In the Defendants’ view, there could be no constitutional foul because McClure, 
much like an individual found to be in civil contempt, held the keys to release from 
punishment in his own hands.  All McClure had to do was to shape up, the Defendants 




In support of this position the Defendants rely upon a number of cases where 
inmates were deprived of basic needs such as food or exercise as a result of persistently 
disrespecting prison rules.  However, in the cases upon which the Defendants rely, the 
inmates’ rule violations made provision of the deprived needs difficult or dangerous.  
Indeed, most of the cases the Defendants rely upon involve prisoners refusing to comply 
with safety protocol required to receive meals.9  These cases are clearly distinguishable.  
Most of McClure’s misconduct was completely unrelated to the mattress restriction.  
Providing McClure with a functional mattress would not have placed correctional officers 
or other inmates at risk.  As to the unrelated misconduct, the record reflects that McClure 
was regularly disciplined.  He was placed in administrative segregation for periods of 
time, and was also required to wear handcuffs and shackles at various times whenever out 
of his cell.  With regard to his misconduct that did relate to the mattress, McClure 
destroyed one mattress, not multiple, and claims to have done so for a specific reason—to 
crawl inside and stay warm when his requests for blankets went unanswered.  We do not 
condone McClure’s destruction of prison property, but using his destruction of one 
 
9 See Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2006) (in maximum security prison where 
inmates were served meals in their cells, the plaintiff was denied many meals over a two-
year period because he refused to comply with requirement that, when meals were 
served, inmates stand in the middle of their cell, with the light on, wearing certain 
clothing); Rodriguez v. Briley, 403 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2005) (the plaintiff was denied 
between 300 and 350 meals over an 18-month period because he refused to place certain 
required belongings in a designated box in his cell before leaving to go to the cafeteria); 
Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998) (the plaintiff was denied 50 meals over a 
five-month period when he refused to kneel with his hands behind his back as meals were 




mattress, under these circumstances, as grounds for depriving him of a functional 
mattress for an extended period of time was inappropriate under the Eighth Amendment.  
Cf. Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992) (“There is a fundamental 
difference between depriving a prisoner of privileges he may enjoy and depriving him of 
the basic necessities of human existence. . . . The duration and conditions of [the 
deprivation] cannot be ignored in deciding whether [the deprivation] meets constitutional 
standards.”) (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978)), superseded by statute 
on other grounds as stated in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Furthermore, the fact that McClure desperately tried to hold on to the only mattress he 
had, come daytime, to avoid more time lying directly on a concrete slab did not justify a 
continuing violation of his Eighth Amendment rights in these circumstances.   
The Defendants also cite Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001), where 
the plaintiff was ultimately deprived of yard privileges for one year, dispensed in 90-day 
increments tied to four infractions: beating a guard to the point of hospitalization; setting 
a fire which produced so much smoke that some prisoners had to be evacuated; spitting in 
the face of a guard who tried to restrain him after he assaulted another guard; and 
throwing a bottle of bodily fluids in a medical technician’s face.  All of these infractions 
occurred outside the inmate’s cell.  Pearson too is distinguishable.  The plaintiff in 
Pearson lost yard privileges because his misconduct demonstrated that letting him into 




neutralizing a known danger by depriving McClure of a functional mattress over the 
course of more than 200 days.  Again, the dangers created by McClure’s unrelated 
misconduct were addressed by placing him in administrative segregation.  This case 
would be similar to a situation in which, instead of a mattress, the Defendants arbitrarily 
chose meals to withhold, told McClure he would receive an insufficient number of meals 
if he did not improve his wholly unrelated misconduct, and then used his displeasure over 
the deprivation of the meals to deprive him of still more meals.10  In short, the Defendants 
have pointed to no legitimate penological reason for the mattress restriction, and we 
reject the Defendants’ argument that McClure’s actions justified the restriction. 
Finally, the Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because, 
even if there was an Eighth Amendment violation, the right at play was not clearly 
established.  “Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages 
liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly 
established at the time of the challenged conduct.”  Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 
 
10 The Defendants also contend that the mattress restriction was justified as a security 
measure because McClure had a history of using objects, such as mattress stuffing, to 
block the window on his cell door.  However, the Defendants acknowledge that McClure 
denies ever doing so with the stuffing from the mattress in question.  To combat this 
disputed issue of fact, the Defendants unimpressively assert that “it is obvious that the 
stuffing could be used for that purpose by an inmate with a propensity for doing so.”  
(Appellees’ Br. at 16) (emphasis added).  We are unpersuaded by this justification for the 
long running mattress restriction as the Defendants have fallen well short of showing that 
this was a pervasive issue with McClure, let alone to a degree that would necessitate 





664 (2012) (citation omitted).  The contours of a clearly established right must be 
“sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right.”  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).  Clearly established does 
not mean that “the very action in question has previously been held unlawful.”  Hope v. 
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).  Indeed, “[t]o prevail against a claim of qualified 
immunity, the plaintiff need not produce ‘a case directly on point, but existing precedent 
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’”  Thomas v. 
Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 
(2011)).  “[T]he salient question . . . is whether the state of the law’ at the time of an 
incident provided ‘fair warning’ to the defendants ‘that their alleged [conduct] was 
unconstitutional.’”  Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting 
Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).  We conclude that, at the time the mattress restriction was in 
effect, it was clearly established that an inmate could not be effectively deprived a 
functional mattress for over 200 days, for no legitimate penological reason, particularly 
where the deprivation caused the exacerbation of his pre-existing back problems.  See 
Mammana, 934 F.3d at 371-74;11 cf. Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 
754, 757 (3d Cir. 1979). 
For these reasons, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and will 
remand for further proceedings. 
 
11 Although Mammana was decided after the events at issue, it broke no new ground and 
relied upon a considerable amount of well-established case law. 
